Mercurial > hg > octave-shane > gnulib-hg
annotate lib/idpriv.h @ 17255:d81be792518a
update from texinfo
author | Karl Berry <karl@freefriends.org> |
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date | Tue, 01 Jan 2013 15:51:49 -0800 |
parents | e542fd46ad6f |
children | 344018b6e5d7 |
rev | line source |
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11613 | 1 /* Dropping uid/gid privileges of the current process. |
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e542fd46ad6f
maint: update all copyright year number ranges
Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
parents:
16201
diff
changeset
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2 Copyright (C) 2009-2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc. |
11613 | 3 |
4 This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
5 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
6 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or | |
7 (at your option) any later version. | |
8 | |
9 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
10 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
11 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
12 GNU General Public License for more details. | |
13 | |
14 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
15 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ | |
16 | |
17 #ifndef _IDPRIV_H | |
18 #define _IDPRIV_H | |
19 | |
20 #ifdef __cplusplus | |
21 extern "C" { | |
22 #endif | |
23 | |
24 /* This module allows programs which are installed with setuid or setgid bit | |
25 (and which therefore initially run with an effective user id or group id | |
26 different from the one of the current user) to drop their uid or gid | |
27 privilege, either permanently or temporarily. | |
28 | |
29 It is absolutely necessary to minimize the amount of code that is running | |
30 with escalated privileges (e.g. with effective uid = root). The reason is | |
31 that any bug or exploit in a part of a program that is running with | |
32 escalated privileges is a security vulnerability that - upon discovery - | |
33 puts the users in danger and requires immediate fixing. Then consider that | |
34 there's a bug every 10 or 20 lines of code on average... | |
35 | |
36 For programs that temporarily drop privileges but have the ability to | |
37 restore them later, there are additionally the dangers that | |
38 - Any bug in the non-privileged part of the program may be used to | |
39 create invalid data structures that will trigger security | |
40 vulnerabilities in the privileged part of the program. | |
41 - Code execution exploits in the non-privileged part of the program may | |
42 be used to invoke the function that restores high privileges and then | |
43 execute additional arbitrary code. | |
44 | |
45 1) The usual, and reasonably safe, way to minimize the amount of code | |
46 running with privileges is to create a separate executable, with setuid | |
47 or setgid bit, that contains only code for the tasks that require | |
48 privileges (and,of course, strict checking of the arguments, so that the | |
49 program cannot be abused). The main program is installed without setuid | |
50 or setgid bit. | |
51 | |
52 2) A less safe way is to do some privileged tasks at the beginning of the | |
53 program's run, and drop privileges permanently as soon as possible. | |
54 | |
55 Note: There may still be security issues if the privileged task puts | |
56 sensitive data into the process memory or opens communication channels | |
57 to restricted facilities. | |
58 | |
59 3) The most unsafe way is to drop privileges temporarily for most of the | |
60 main program but to re-enable them for the duration of privileged tasks. | |
61 | |
62 As explained above, this approach has uncontrollable dangers for | |
63 security. | |
64 | |
65 This approach is normally not usable in multithreaded programs, because | |
66 you cannot know what kind of system calls the other threads could be | |
67 doing during the time the privileges are enabled. | |
68 | |
69 With approach 1, you don't need gnulib modules. | |
70 With approach 2, you need the gnulib module 'idpriv-drop'. | |
71 With approach 3, you need the gnulib module 'idpriv-droptemp'. But really, | |
72 you should better stay away from this approach. | |
73 */ | |
74 | |
11620 | 75 /* For more in-depth discussion of these topics, see the papers/articles |
76 * Hao Chen, David Wagner, Drew Dean: Setuid Demystified | |
77 <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec02/full_papers/chen/chen.pdf> | |
78 * Dan Tsafrir, Dilma da Silva, David Wagner: The Murky Issue of Changing | |
79 Process Identity: Revising "Setuid Demystified" | |
80 <http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/setuid-login08b.pdf> | |
81 <http://code.google.com/p/change-process-identity/> | |
82 * Dhruv Mohindra: Observe correct revocation order while relinquishing | |
83 privileges | |
84 <https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/POS36-C.+Observe+correct+revocation+order+while+relinquishing+privileges> | |
85 */ | |
11613 | 86 |
87 | |
88 /* For approach 2. */ | |
89 | |
90 /* Drop the uid and gid privileges of the current process. | |
91 Return 0 if successful, or -1 with errno set upon failure. The recommended | |
92 handling of failure is to terminate the process. */ | |
93 extern int idpriv_drop (void); | |
94 | |
95 | |
96 /* For approach 3. */ | |
97 | |
98 /* Drop the uid and gid privileges of the current process in a way that allows | |
99 them to be restored later. | |
100 Return 0 if successful, or -1 with errno set upon failure. The recommended | |
101 handling of failure is to terminate the process. */ | |
102 extern int idpriv_temp_drop (void); | |
103 | |
104 /* Restore the uid and gid privileges of the current process. | |
105 Return 0 if successful, or -1 with errno set upon failure. The recommended | |
106 handling of failure is to not perform the actions that require the escalated | |
107 privileges. */ | |
108 extern int idpriv_temp_restore (void); | |
109 | |
110 | |
111 #ifdef __cplusplus | |
112 } | |
113 #endif | |
114 | |
115 | |
116 #endif /* _IDPRIV_H */ |